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Although feminist perspectives have contributed substantially to the 
development of both theory and practice in many areas of law, 
feminism has contributed relatively little to discussions regarding 
intellectual property.  This paper examines the relationship between 
hypermedia and feminist discourse and critiques the role of copyright 
in controlling or suppressing such discourses.  Hypertext and related 
media may lend themselves to relational webs of meaning rather than 
linear progressions of meaning.  Given the importance of non-
hierarchical, associative webs to feminist discourse, digital media may 
lend itself to feminist modes of thinking or, at minimum, challenge 
dominant textual constructions.  However, current copyright doctrine 
assumes that works remain linear, hierarchical, and controlled.  The 
exclusive rights conferred by copyright, especially the right of 
adaptation, lend themselves to authorial control over not only the 
text, but also to a reader’s use of the text.  This deterrent 
characteristic of copyright has appeared in several recent legal 
disputes involving hypertext linking and annotation.  Thus, copyright 
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remains hostile to non-traditional collaborative or relational user 
engagement.  This hostility may ultimately frustrate copyright’s 
purpose of promoting the “progress” of knowledge. 
* * * 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, feminist theories on law have been 
applied to a wide range of legal subjects, challenging the conventional 
understanding of nearly every imaginable area from bankruptcy1 to 
business associations2 to torts3 to evidence.4  The application of 
feminist approaches to law has been far more than an academic 
abstraction.  Although much remains to be said and done before 
gender bias in the law is completely understood or comprehensively 
addressed, feminist perspectives have already played a substantial role 
in reforming doctrine and practice in a wide variety of areas, 
including criminal law,5 family law,6 and employment law.7 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of 
Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1506, 1554-56 (1990) (advocating a feminist 
perspective in bankruptcy proceedings that focuses on women debtors and their 
experiences). 
 2. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other 
Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
1387, 1446-56 (1992) (arguing that limited liability is not a desirable scheme for 
feminism); Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and 
Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543, 571 
(1985) (urging feminist scholars to research the creation and culture of business 
organizations in order to challenge the patriarchal nature of the corporate world). 
 3. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, 
Mass Torts, Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 849, 885-86 (proposing that 
the more empowered party in tort litigation maintain the burden of proof in order to 
level the playing field between parties); Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Tort 
Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 579-89, 595-96 (1993) (surveying feminist 
critiques of tort law and encouraging the continuation of feminist analysis of torts, 
especially in the areas of litigation strategies, compensation schemes, and the 
underlying gender biases of the common law). 
 4. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited 
Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 159, 212-217 (1997) 
(proposing a change to the excited utterance exception that would allow for the 
admittance of statements made by survivors of rape and sexual violence at any time 
after the incident). 
 5. See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 7 (1987) (arguing that the law should 
treat “simple” rape, where the offender is unarmed and known by the victim, equally 
to aggravated rape). 
 6. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 183 (1989) 
(arguing that the family must be a just institution where men and women are 
genderless and participate equally in maintaining the family); Martha Minow, Rights 
for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children’s Rights, 9 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 15 (1986) (promoting a feminist approach that focuses on 
relationships, connections with others, and context to further develop the concept of 
children’s rights). 
 7. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the 
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-
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Curiously, intellectual property has not figured among the legal 
subject matters addressed or reformed by feminist perspectives.  
Indeed, intellectual property appears to have been largely overlooked 
in feminist critiques of law and, with only a few exceptions, has been 
entirely neglected by feminist commentators.8  This oversight is 
surprising given the increasing prominence of intellectual property 
law and its potential impact on the quality of life for millions of men 
and women across the globe.  Further, this area does not seem free 
from the gendered assumptions that infect other areas of law.  From 
the gendered rhetoric of “conception”9 and “paternity”10 to the more 
subtle biases in protectable subject matter,11 the law of intellectual 
property appears as ripe for feminist examination as any field of law to 
date. 
In this essay, I offer a step toward such an effort by examining 
copyright and digital content through a feminist lens, specifically 
discussing the treatment of hypertext works under copyright law.  My 
hope is to disclose certain biases latent in the treatment of digital 
works, suggest feminist approaches to these problems, and lay some 
groundwork for continued feminist study of copyright.  I begin by 
reviewing feminist critique of hypertext and related digital media, 
linking such views to some of the broader commentary that has 
emerged regarding hypermedia.  I then discuss the impact that 
current copyright law has upon these theories, in particular the 
                                                          
C.L. L. REV. 79, 135-54 (1989) (critiquing discrimination analysis because it focuses on 
biological sex rather than gender and it fails to effectively deal with patriarchal 
power). 
 8. To date, the most developed feminist examination of copyright law remains 
Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. 
WOMEN & L. 59, 94-96 (1994) (discussing copyright law’s inadequate protection of the 
artistic creations of women, specifically Nineteenth century English novels and 
needlework).  For other critiques see Debora Halbert, Poaching and Plagiarizing: 
Property, Plagiarism and Feminist Futures, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111, 113 (Lisa Buranen & Alice M. 
Roy eds., 1999) (critiquing the traditional “paternity metaphor” of intellectual 
property, in which the creation of an author is his child); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE 
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE 
LAW 102-09, 124-26 (1998) (discussing the protection of the celebrity through 
copyright and publicity rights from a feminist perspective); Linda Lacey, Of Bread 
and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1537 n.18 (employing the feminist 
methodology of personalization to illustrate flaws in copyright doctrine). 
 9. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2005) (requiring the use of the date an inventor 
conceived an idea if there is a patent related dispute between inventors over the same 
invention). 
 10. See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A 
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 130 (1997) (noting 
that the right of attribution, also called the right of paternity, allows an artist to 
contest the use of his name in works he has not created, as well as to require his name 
to be associated with his work, even after parting with the copyright). 
 11. See Wright, supra note 8 at 62, 68, 87-89. 
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application of copyright as a canon of control by users of hypermedia.  
I then suggest how this analysis might lead to a more general feminist 
critique of copyright, to understand and to reform the “promotion of 
progress” objective for copyright law, and ultimately illustrate how 
copyright may be an exceptionally rich area for application of feminist 
theory. 
I.  FEMINISM AND HYPERTEXT 
Hypertext has its origins in digital media, in computer-mediated 
communications formats that are characterized by digitized content.  
Digital media in general has been noted for its “plasticity,” that is, for 
the malleable and mercurial nature of digitized content.12  Hypertext 
partakes of this malleability.  Perhaps the most familiar form of 
hypertext or hypermedia today is the World Wide Web protocol 
developed by Tim Berners-Lee for use on the Internet and related 
systems.13  However, other species of hypertext vary.  These electronic 
systems typically present automated textual associations, which, when 
activated by the user, call up linked blocks of text, allowing the user to 
choose more than a single path through the interconnected 
sequences of material.14  When media other than text, such as 
graphics, sound, or animation, are interconnected in a similar 
fashion, the result is sometimes “hypermedia” rather than hypertext.15  
The medium will also frequently allow the user to create or generate 
new automated associations, linking the portions of text either to 
other portions of the work itself, or to other works.16  In many such 
applications, the user also is able to make additional alterations to the 
work, such as by attaching or overlaying annotations on the text, 
creating “highlighted” or emphasized portions of text and generating 
customized indices or navigational aids. 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, RULES OF THE ROAD FOR THE INFORMATION 
SUPERHIGHWAY 676 (1996). 
 13. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 609 
n.32 (2005) (crediting Berners-Lee with inventing the World Wide Web protocol). 
 14. See THEODOR HOLM NELSON, LITERARY MACHINES 0/3 (90.1 ed. 1990) 
(describing the ability of hypertext to allow the reader to follow a train of thought 
instead of a mandatory direction). 
 15. See GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT: THE CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY 
CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 3-4 (1992) (explaining the distinction between 
hypertext, which refers to text and the electronic links to other blocks of text, and 
hypermedia, which includes electronic links between text and a broad array of 
images, sounds, and text). 
 16. See Pamela Samuelson, Some New Kinds of Authorship Made Possible by 
Computers and Some Intellectual Property Questions They Raise, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 
685, 695-96 (1992) [hereinafter Samuelson, Some New Kinds] (noting that adapting 
a traditionally printed book into hypertext requires additional skills in order to make 
the converted electronic source navigable and useful). 
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With the emergence of such media, the potential congruence of 
these hypertext characteristics with feminist theory was quickly noted 
by a number of commentators who, at their most enthusiastic, depict 
hypertext as “a mode of thought and a language ripe with potential 
for speaking a new feminist critical voice.”17  Admittedly, the feminist 
voice to which hypertext may lend itself might not be easily 
ascertainable.  Feminism encompasses a diverse range of viewpoints 
and traditions, not all of which are compatible, and some of which are 
entirely contradictory.18  It would be difficult to summarize a 
canonical perspective of what constitutes a “feminist voice,” and 
probably counterproductive to try.  Indeed, a central tenet of many 
forms of feminist critique is the importance of alternative or 
neglected perspectives, making “feminism” by definition impossible to 
capture in a simple definition.19  However, while feminist views do not 
lend themselves to bumper stickers or T-shirt slogans, it is possible for 
the present analysis to identify particular strands in the feminist 
tapestry, particularly those that have intersected with the literature on 
hypertext that may intersect with certain aspects of copyright. 
A considerable body of feminist literature focuses on themes of 
contextuality and responsibility that seem lacking in dominant 
cultural discourse, which feminist commentators characterize as 
emphasizing the separation of self from others, adopting a linear or 
hierarchical approach to reasoning that defines the world in terms of 
isolated and oppositional categories.20  Such categorical hierarchies 
tend to comprise strings of dichotomous pairs, one of which is either 
expressly or implicitly superior to the other.  Feminist theory suggests 
that such evaluative structures both reflect and encourage habits of 
thought that lead to alienation and subordination of those 
categorized as “other.” 
A variety of feminist commentators have proposed that, in order to 
counteract patriarchal dominance, it is desirable to develop discursive 
approaches that emphasize interconnectedness or relational 
                                                          
 17. Carolyn Guertin, Gesturing Toward the Visual: Virtual Reality, Hypertext and 
Embodied Feminist Criticism, 8 SURFACES (Jun. 30, 1999), http://www.pum. 
umontreal.ca/revues/surfaces/vol8/guertin.pdf. 
 18. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 3, 5 (1998) (explaining that individual feminists may have different 
priorities and outlooks on the world). 
 19. See Karen Engle et al., Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal 
Movements?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 239-240 (2003) (noting that different 
groups of feminists define feminism in a variety of ways). 
 20. See generally CATHERINE KELLER, FROM A BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, 
AND SELF (1986) (discussing that different conceptions of identity form a web of 
understanding of being). 
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thinking.21  At least some commentators suggest that feminist 
thinking entails understanding the self in relation to, rather than in 
opposition to, others and the world.22  Under this approach, it is 
frequently suggested that the feminine biology of procreation, 
gestation, and childbearing gives rise to a sense of self that is 
physically, mentally, and emotionally connected to others.23  Thus, 
feminine experience may lend itself to collective and collaborative 
understanding, rather than to the individual and confrontational 
understanding that characterizes patriarchy.24 
The writings of Carol Gilligan have been highly influential in this 
regard.  Based on responses to interview questions that demonstrated 
differing problem-solving approaches by gender, Gilligan proposed 
that women tend to approach reasoning in a distinctly “feminine” 
manner that is contextual, relational, and personal.25  By contrast, 
“masculine” reasoning appeared to emphasize objectivity, 
individuality, and abstraction.26  Gilligan metaphorically characterized 
the feminine approach in terms of “webs” of interconnectedness and 
the masculine approach in terms of “ladders” of hierarchy.  The 
feminine approach adopts rhetoric of responsibility and caring, 
whereas the masculine approach adopts rhetoric of rights and 
equality.27  The “different voice” of feminine discourse, she suggested, 
has historically been ignored or drowned out in favor of the more 
dominant masculine approach.28 
In the study of digital technologies, Gilligan’s intellectual and 
empirical successors include researchers who have demonstrated that 
                                                          
 21. See Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK 
L.J. 183, 192-93 (1994) (noting that Carol Gilligan’s cultural/relational school of 
feminism emphasized that women could find happiness within their roles). 
 22. See id. (observing that the cultural/relational school of feminism stresses the 
differences between men and women, emphasizing that women are “separate but 
equal to” men). 
 23. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1988) 
(noting that cultural feminists believe that connections between people lead women 
to be nurturers, while radical feminists believe that the connection is forced and 
intrusive). 
 24. See id. at 50 (distinguishing between cultural feminism’s appreciation of 
women’s “ethic of care” from patriarchy’s appreciation of separate spheres for men 
and women). 
 25. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 160 (1982) (finding that they take into account a person’s 
obligations to others in determining what is morally correct in a particular situation). 
 26. See id. at 160-61 (noting that responses from men focused on their own 
personalities rather than their relationships with people). 
 27. See id. at 160 (noting women grounded their answers in their relationship 
with others, while men focused on their own achievements). 
 28. See id. at 173 (arguing that the dominance of males in psychological research 
has led to an assumption of one style of speech, thus silencing women’s voices and 
contributions). 
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women tend to engage computer-mediated communication 
differently than their male counterparts.29  Studies conducted by 
these researchers find evidence that masculine and feminine styles of 
discourse occur in computer mediated communication, particularly in 
listserves, Usenet groups, and other fora on the Internet.  Researchers 
find that men are prone to communicate in styles characterized by 
direct, terse, and even confrontative language, such as “flaming,” 
while women tend to adhere to rhetoric of politeness, support, and 
personalization.30  The masculine style of discourse may be more 
compatible and even consonant with the relatively decontextualized 
design of the medium.  Absent the cues of gesture, facial expression, 
and vocal tonal quality, women may be hampered in their preferred 
contextual communicative mode. 
Such studies suggest that computer technology is by no means 
gender-neutral and imply that women might be systematically 
disadvantaged by either the design of the computer technology or by 
the social customs attending its use, if indeed women tend to 
communicate differently.  This line of reasoning further suggests that 
by privileging certain forms of communication over others, some 
digital technologies may be better adapted to different discursive 
modes and therefore may encourage or promote certain types of 
cultural assumptions. 
It seems only fair to note that Gilligan’s observations and analysis, 
though enormously influential, also have been controversial and 
vigorously critiqued.31  As an initial matter, it is unclear whether 
Gilligan’s empirical observations were robust enough to support her 
proposals.  It is similarly unclear whether the “difference” Gilligan 
describes, if it exists, arises as a matter of biology or as a matter of 
acculturation.  Even among women, it is unclear whether variations in 
                                                          
 29. See, e.g., Susan Herring, Posting in a Different Voice: Gender and Ethics in 
Computer-Mediated Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COMPUTER-
MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 115 (Charles Ess ed., 1996) (arguing that computer 
network etiquette standards are based on men’s communication styles, and that this 
male-oriented standard makes women feel less comfortable using compter-mediated 
communication (CMC)); Susan Herring, Gender Differences in CMC: Findings and 
Implications, 18 CPSR J. 1, 1 (Winter 2000) [hereinafter Herring, Gender 
Differences], http://www.cpsr.org/previste/publications/newsletters/issues/2000/ 
Winter2000/herring.html (noting that traditional gender styles have permeated into 
CMC, as evidenced by the dominance of men in mixed-sex public discussion groups, 
where women post fewer messages and receive fewer responses than men). 
 30. See Herring, Gender Differences, supra note 29, at 1 (noting that while men 
tend to criticize insult and violate online rules, women are apt to apologize and thank 
other members of online groups). 
 31. See generally Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 
(1989) (acknowledging the idea of gender differences, yet rejecting Gilligan’s 
descriptions as inaccurate and destructive because they provide a respected academic 
context for reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes). 
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ethnicity, race, class, age, and sexual orientation might give voice to 
the same “difference” or to a chorus of differences.  This leads to yet 
another concern: that, to the extent that such a difference exists, 
from whatever origins, injudicious emphasis on Gilligan’s “different 
voice” might paradoxically tend to reinforce another of the false 
oppositions that so many feminists have critiqued in masculine or 
patriarchal discourse. 
For the purposes of this discussion, however, it is unnecessary to 
establish or defend any strong form of relational thesis, whether 
Gilligan’s findings are statistically robust, whether the “different voice” 
she identifies is biological or cultural, or even whether relational 
perception is gender-specific.  The discussion here requires a far 
more modest and, I hope, uncontroversial premise: that relational 
reasoning exists as an alternative to abstract hierarchical reasoning, 
which is, at least for some, the preferred form of learning regardless 
of gender. 
If, as Herring and others have suggested, such relational reasoning 
is stifled by the design characteristics of certain technologies, it may 
be that certain technologies are conducive to communication in 
Gilligan’s “different voice.”  Hypertext may be an attractive candidate 
for such possible congruence between such reasoning and media 
characteristics.  Certainly this connection has been suggested by 
feminist commentators.32  Concerned as it is with themes of resisting 
hierarchy, reversing authoritarian dominance, reversing 
subordination, promoting relational reasoning, and exposing 
oppositional thinking, feminist theory seems naturally consonant with 
the deconstructive attributes of hypertext.  The linked and associative 
structure of hypertext appears to reflect and embody the same 
relational motifs found in a great deal of feminist thought.  Thus, 
hypertext in particular and digital media in general might serve both 
the positive and critical agendas of feminist theorists. 
First, given the importance of associative, interconnected webs of 
                                                          
 32. See, e.g., Barbara Page, Women Writers and the Restive Text: Feminism, 
Experimental Writing and Hypertext, 6 POSTMODERN CULTURE: AN ELECTRONIC J. OF 
INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITICISM 11-12 (Jan., 1996) (asserting that the hypertext medium 
realizes the feminist goal of inviting the discourse of others by allowing the reader to 
intervene in the text); Annette Comte, Use of Feminist Literary Theory in Developing 
a Critical Language for Hypertext, 4 TEXT: J. AUSTL. ASS’N WRITING PROGRAMS 
(2000), http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/oct00/comte.htm (reasoning that 
the flexibility of the hypertext medium is compatible to the style of feminist writers 
such as Monique Witting, Virginia Woolf, and Luce Irigaray); see also Donna 
LeCourt, & Luann Barnes, Writing Multiplicity: Hypertext and Feminist Textual 
Politics, 16 COMPUTERS AND COMPOSITION 55-56 (1999) (investigating the use of 
hypertext as a way to realize a feminist politic by disrupting the contexts and 
communities and by deconstructing the idea of the author as an individual not open 
to other perspectives and ideologies). 
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meaning in much of feminist theory, digital media might naturally 
foster such feminist modes of thinking.  In particular, the linked 
characteristics of hypertext and related media might lend themselves 
to relational webs of meaning rather than a linear progression of 
meaning, offering an environment that is conducive to the “different 
voice” that relational feminism argues has long been suppressed.  By 
substituting a web of textual relationships for a linear, dialectic 
progression of concepts, hypertext appears to eschew old habits of 
textual dominance and subordination and to upend established 
conceptual hierarchies.33  The open and recursive nature of 
hypertext works may disrupt the textual appearances of coherence 
and unity.34  This in turn suggests that digital media might 
accommodate novel or subversive modes of learning and authorship. 
This end might also be furthered by hypertext characteristics that 
collapse the false dichotomy of reader and writer.  By placing the 
reader and the writer on an equal footing in a creative environment, 
hypertext seems to merge the divided concepts of “author” and 
“reader” by which users and creators of text are defined as “other.”  
This in turn seems to nullify the dominance of authorial control in 
favor of shared textual interpretation, tending toward the 
collaborative and collective modes of understanding so important to 
relational feminist theory. 
In a more negative or critical vein, hypertext might, at minimum, 
challenge textual constructions that have been characterized as 
masculine or dominating.  The a-linear nature of hypertextual lexia 
appears to disrupt hierarchies prevalent in classical texts as much as 
feminism seeks to disrupt hierarchy in patriarchal society.  Text 
embodies thought, and the form of text shapes the form of thought.35  
If classic texts take the form of linearity and hierarchy, those reading 
such texts might become accustomed to such forms.  However, by 
subverting those forms, hypertext might subvert patriarchal habits of 
thought.36  Thus, attributes of hypertext might expose, and ultimately 
                                                          
 33. See Carlton Clark, Surely Teaching Hypertext in the Composition Classroom 
Qualifies as a Feminist Pedagogy?, 6:2 KAIROS 1, 1 (2001), http://english.ttu.edu 
/kairos/6.2/binder2.html?coverweb/gender/clark/index.htm (stating that elite 
literature, because it was not created within a social vacuum, reflects social inequities 
and hierarchies and is therefore gendered). 
 34. See Wendy Morgan, Electronic Tools for Dismantling the Master's House: 
Poststructuralist Feminist Research and Hypertext Poetics, 1999 ACM CONFERENCE ON 
HYPERTEXT AND HYPERMEDIA 207, 209 (1999), available at http://portal.acm.org 
(discussing that the order in hypertext depends on the reader’s decisions and it may 
seem fragmented although it is still inherently logical). 
 35. See id. at 209 (stating that hypertext promotes associative thinking, which is 
comparable to the mind creating metaphors through a series of jumps). 
 36. See id. at 211 (arguing that hypertext encompasses voice, discourse, and 
argumentation).  This results in subverting a conclusive argument in the text, which is 
9
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help displace, the patriarchal assumptions latent in the nature of 
classic linear texts.  By foregrounding the reader and loosing the 
constraints of authorial sequencing, hypertext might well fulfill the 
feminist imperative to free readers from “constricting habits of mind, 
encouraging them to critically question authority and arrive at a vision 
of possibility radically different from the existing social 
construction.”37  Consequently, hypertext has been suggested as a 
medium uniquely suited for the embodiment of feminist discourse 
and equally suited for fostering the habit of feminist discourse. 
II.  TEXT AND AUTHORITY 
The interactive hypertext character that suggests to some feminists 
the basis for a new and liberating form of discourse has similarly been 
the subject of intense scrutiny using other theoretical approaches, 
most importantly those drawn from literary theory.  These separate 
analyses have been highly influential and bear an important 
relationship to the feminist approach.  The apparent interactivity and 
heightened user engagement of hypertext media captured the 
imagination of many early hypertext theorists, to whom such digital 
media appeared to present a practical example of postmodern literary 
theory.38  These commentators have argued that the characteristics of 
hypertext make explicit the “re-coding” of texts theorized by Barthes, 
Derrida, and others.39  Although postmodern literary theorists were 
primarily concerned with the interaction of the reader with standard 
print-based texts, their views on meaning, authorship, and 
interpretation of texts seemed readily extensible to hypertext.  In 
particular, the distinction drawn by Barthes between “writerly” texts 
and “readerly” texts seemed directly applicable to hypertext.40 
These terms were intended to designate certain textual qualities 
that resulted in certain types of reader interaction.  The terminology 
is perhaps unfortunate, as these commonly employed translations of 
Barthes’ neologisms “lisable” and “scriptable” might at first glance 
                                                          
seen by feminists as patriarchal delusion of grandeur.  Id. 
 37. Kristine J. Anderson, Some Feminist Predecessors of Hypertext, 1999 
WOMEN’S WORLD ’99 INTERDISC. CONGRESS ON WOMEN PROC. & REP. 1, 3 (1999), 
available at http://www.skk.uit.no/WW99/papers/Anderson_Kristine_J.pdf. 
 38. See LANDOW, supra note 15, at 2-3 (explaining that the writings of Theodor 
Nelson and Andries van Dam argue for abandonment of traditional literary theory in 
favor of theory centered on multilinearity, nodes, and networks). 
 39. See id. (noting that these commentators argued for the rejection of 
conceptual systems that are founded on the ideas of “center, margin, hierarchy, and 
linearity”). 
 40. See ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z 4 (Richard Miller trans., Hill and Wang 1974) 
(1970) (noting the distinction between “writerly,” what can be written and re-written, 
and, “readerly,” which can be read but not written). 
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seem to refer to textual characteristics afforded by the classic roles of 
the author and reader.  But this was a distinction that Barthes rejected 
and sought to eliminate.  In fact the distinction is rather more subtle, 
referring to modes of interaction that the reader might assume.  
Barthes was concerned with the origination of meaning in texts and 
with textual characteristics that invited new meanings. 
He defined writerly or scriptable texts as those that gain meaning 
from the reader and invite the reader to in essence become a writer 
by engaging in the writerly act of interpretation.41  Thus, writerly texts 
will tend toward openness or even incompleteness and so may appear 
rough, unfinished, or disorderly.  Making sense of such a text requires 
the reader to participate in the creation of meaning, re-inscribing the 
text to fill in interpretive gaps.  Such reader participation happens, to 
some extent, with every text, but some texts will expose this process, 
while others will attempt to conceal it. 
Writerly text, with its conspicuous gaps and lacunae and multiple 
points of entry, exemplifies the incomplete quality of texts generally.  
Barthes maintained that any text consists ultimately of fragments 
drawn from multiple named and unnamed precursor sources, linked 
together in a matrix of conceptual relations, some of which might be 
intended by the author assembling them, others which might be 
perceived by later readers.42  Thus, the rough texture of the writerly 
text merely exposes the characteristics of any text.  Its unfinished 
quality differs from other texts in degree more than in kind. 
In contrast to the explicit writerly text, readerly or lisable texts resist 
reinterpretation, adhering to an interpretation dictated by the initial 
author. These texts distance themselves from the reader’s 
reinterpretation by facilitating only a single, linear progression of 
meaning.  They leave the reader in the classic role of the reader, 
merely absorbing or accepting the meaning that seems most obvious 
on the face of the text.  Because such classic texts lull the reader into 
passivity, they characterize for Barthes “the pitiless divorce which the 
literary institution maintains between the producer of the text and its 
user, between its owner and its customer, between its author and its 
reader.”43 
Consequently, unlike the incomplete surface of the writerly text, 
readerly texts will tend to appear seamless and unified, and therefore 
convey the illusion of a pre-determined and fixed reading.  Even if the 
reader is in fact supplying a good deal of the textual meaning, she is 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (stating that the goal of literary work is to change the reader from just 
a consumer of text to a producer as well). 
 43. Id. at 3. 
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not doing so consciously or purposefully as an act of writing or of re-
writing.  The reader thus falls into the role of a passive recipient of 
meaning, engaged only in the act of reading or accepting the 
“authorized” text, the text originating from the author. 
Derrida equates this sort of passivity with a “dead” text, which is 
static, inert, and never conveys more than a single authorized 
message.44  By contrast, when the text invites readers to imbue the 
text with new meaning, it becomes dynamic, evolutionary, and alive.  
The difference in textual quality can thus dramatically shift the 
reader’s role from mere consumption of text to production, making 
every reader in essence an “author.”  Paradoxically, the text termed 
writerly may seem the least inviting to the reader because its 
incomplete nature forces the reader to engage in consciously 
interpretive work, whereas the “readerly” text may seem the most 
satisfactory to the initial author, as it appears the more complete and 
polished product. 
III.  AUTHORITY AND HYPERTEXT 
Many forms of digital media lend themselves to writerly 
manipulation, allowing the reader to re-order or link elements of the 
text, or to annotate and alter the content of the text.  Readers have 
always mentally interpreted or re-coded texts, but the malleability of 
digital texts makes this process manifest.  By re-configuring the 
elements of the text, readers may establish relationships within or 
between texts not originally contemplated by the initial author or 
authors.  Hypertext thus tends toward the writerly appearance and 
facilitates deconstruction of the text by displaying the text’s cognitive 
skeleton, uncovering the relational structure of the constituent lexia. 
Hypertext similarly foregrounds the relational linkages that 
postmodern theorists focus on as creating meaning within a text.  As 
the reader moves from node to node in a hypertext document, the 
work takes its meaning, not so much from the intention of the initial 
author, but from the relationship between lexia and the re-writing 
that occurs as the text is being read.  Thus, Jay David Bolter argues 
that readers of hypertext are no longer subject to authorial 
domination; instead, they are able to choose their own paths and their 
own meanings.45 
                                                          
 44. See JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 136 (Barbara Johnson trans., Univ. Chi. 
Press 1981) (1972) (equating dead text with repetition of the same, which is 
unresponsive if questioned by the reader). 
 45. See JAY DAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE 
HISTORY OF WRITING 134 (1991) (defining electronic writing as writing that invites the 
reader into a conversation with the author and where the reader can participate in 
the way the narrative is constructed). 
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Therefore, hypertext can be seen to work against authorial 
authority as the final arbiter of textual meaning.  The characteristics 
of hypertext work against the illusion of textual unity, and in turn, 
against the assumption that the initial author constitutes the source of 
textual meaning.  Hypertext allows the reader to more easily dis-
integrate the text and determine which textual relationships should 
be accorded meaning and which should not.  The assumption that 
writing originates from a single fixed source of meaning is challenged 
by the possibility of collective authorship created when each reader 
has the ability to augment, alter, or edit the initial text.  By re-
configuring digital texts, readers become collaborators with the initial 
creator, generating a new work that reflects the thought processes or 
learning style of the reader. 
However, more recent commentators have cautioned that these 
purported deconstructive features of hypertext, upon which early 
postmodern paeans are based, may be less revolutionary than they 
seem.  Rather, it may be that there is nothing particularly new or 
unprecedented in these features of hypertext.  Thus, Espen Aarseth 
locates hypertext within the broader and long-established category of 
“ergodic” literature, which is non-linear, requires active reader 
participation, and lacks the familiar sequence of beginning, middle, 
and end.46  He offers the ancient Chinese I Ching,47 certain 
postmodern novels, and even James Joyce as examples of such works 
prior to the advent of electronic digital media.48  Similarly, the 
venerable institution of scholarly footnoting constitutes a form of 
“linking” or referencing other texts and invites disruption in the 
linear progress of footnoted texts as readers peruse the footnotes. 
Indeed, as the examples of footnotes demonstrates, random access 
to texts can to some extent be performed with more traditional 
textual embodiments by ignoring the linear invitation of a folio 
arrangement and accessing its pages out of order.  For example, one 
may read the end of a mystery novel early.  Certainly, many of the 
hypertextual operations that I describe above, such as annotation, 
cross-referencing, and highlighting, are mimetic of actions performed 
with hardcopy paper texts. 
Other commentators have noted that far from consummating the 
                                                          
 46. See ESPEN J. AARSETH, CYBERTEXT: PERSPECTIVES ON ERGODIC LITERATURE 2-3 
(1997) (agreeing all literature can be non-linear, but that hypertext, as ergodic 
literature, has an added Para verbal dimension because the reader is always conscious 
that they will not know the results of their choices or what they missed by selecting a 
particular path). 
 47. See id. at 2 (noting that the I Ching is not meant to be read from beginning 
to end, but instead is meant to be read in a ritualistic fashion). 
 48. See id. at 52 (listing works by Kafka, Verlaine, and Brecht as examples). 
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“death of the author,” hypertext may simply perpetuate authorial 
control.  Hypertext is not altogether chaotic and does not lack 
imposition of authorial form.  Readers may proceed along more than 
one textual sequence, but they are still typically sequences chosen and 
enabled by an author.  Just as classic print text channels reading in 
certain ways, hypertext does as well.  Although readers of a hypertext 
document may have some ability to shape the reading by choosing 
and recombining the sequence of lexia, many documents will 
prescribe the availability of linkages or entry points, where those 
linkages will lead, and the choice of links available in each lexia.  In 
some ways, hypertext may be even more constraining than traditional 
print texts.  To the casual reader, the mechanics of a digital 
document, such as the mark-up code, will be largely inaccessible, 
allowing the reader relatively little autonomy beyond the prescribed 
autonomy afforded by the initial author. 
Similar concerns urge caution from the feminist perspective.  Just 
as the more extravagant claims regarding the deconstructive virtues of 
hypertext require qualification, so too do the claims regarding 
hypertext’s feminist virtues.  Thoughtful commentators, while not 
abandoning the hope that hypertext might further feminist ends, 
caution that this medium may not inherently lend itself to that 
purpose.49  First, as Michelle Kendrick observes, just because 
hypertext is not linear does not mean that it is necessarily feminist; 
she notes that when “lost recently in Pittsburgh, my wanderings were 
nonlinear and I must have past the same street corner eleven times, 
but I would hardly call my ramblings inherently feminist.”50  Similarly, 
it is important not to confuse the discovery of an alternative to 
rational, linear thinking with resisting and transforming the structures 
that enforce and authorize such linearity.51  Indeed the type of 
postmodern hypertext justification offered by many theorists runs the 
risk of re-creating the structure it seeks to subvert, just under a 
different guise.52  The argument that styles hypertextual conduct in 
                                                          
 49. See Morgan, supra note 34, at 214 (stating that technology such as hypertext 
can serve conservative ends, but it can also reinvent and criticize power structures). 
 50. Michelle Kendrick, The Laugh of the Modem: Interactive Technologies and 
L'ecriture Feminine,  4 CYBERFEMINISMS 1, 7 (2002), http://www.rhizomes.net 
/issue4/issue4.kendrick.html. 
 51. See Diane Greco, Hypertext with Consequences: Recovering a Politics of 
Hypertext, 1996 PROCEEDINGS OF 7TH ACM CONF. ON HYPERTEXT 85, 88 (1996), 
available at http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/234828.234837 (stating that while hypertext 
lends itself to an alternative “female” form of writing, in some cases it is no more than 
dominance disguised as support and concerned). 
 52. See id. (reasoning that the Brown University Writers Project runs the risk of 
ghettoizing or politically paralyzing the writers by using hypertext to present 
previously unknown writing by women before the Victorian period). 
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terms of individual “empowerment” may tend to undermine the very 
purposes it intends to embrace.  Power relations are a matter of 
concern in feminist discourse and not all empowerment is beneficial.  
The claim that hypertext facilitates individual empowerment of the 
reader, overthrowing the hegemony of the author, is built upon the 
polarized concept of reader and author.53  This may simply replace 
the image of the overly feminized, passive reader as consumer with a 
reader who becomes the new patriarchal author.54 
To some extent, the structural concerns over authorial control rest 
upon the unwarranted conflation of hypertext with the World Wide 
Web.  The Web allows ordinary readers only a relatively sparse 
opportunity to interact with the text and creation of permanent Web 
links or annotation requires a degree of technical sophistication 
beyond that possessed by most users.  Admittedly, the Web is the most 
prominent and ubiquitous example of digital hypermedia, becoming 
so familiar online as to be mistaken in many instances for the Internet 
itself.  Because following Web links is the most common hypertext 
experience for most users of digital media, it may seem synonymous 
with hypertext use in general. 
Yet, just as the Web is not synonymous with the Internet, the Web 
also is not synonymous with hypertext.  Many other hypertext systems 
exist or can be imagined, which would allow users a full range of easily 
accessible linking and revising tools.  Such systems are the hypertext 
environment that Landow and other early theorists had in mind.55  
Such systems would be far less constricted by the choices of initial 
authors than more recent critics have realized. 
Such systems would also, to some extent, answer the criticism that 
hypertext is nothing new, as they would unquestionably offer far 
greater opportunity for writerly re-inscription than the other form of 
“ergodic” literature.  While it may be possible to read a book out of 
linear order or to follow its footnotes, paper media simply do not lend 
themselves to quick and easy re-ordering in a comprehensive manner.  
One can certainly cut the book apart and rearrange it; however, the 
                                                          
 53. See Carlton Clark, Hypertext Theory and the Rhetoric of Empowerment: A 
Feminist Alternative, 7.3 KAIROS 1 (2002), http://english.ttu.edu/kairos/7.3/binder2 
.html?coverweb/clark/page1.html (concluding that the active writer/passive reader 
dichotomy is incorrect as many reader-response theorists have shown that reading 
conventional print text is an active process). 
 54. See Kendrick, supra note 51, at 1 (recognizing that mostly male theorists 
proclaimed that the associative and non-linear aspects of hypertext would free readers 
from print’s passivity). 
 55. See George Landow, Is This Hypertext Any Good? Judging Quality in 
Hypermedia, 33 DICHTUNG DIGITAL 1, 1 (2004), http://www.dichtung-digital.com 
/2004/3/Landow/index.htm (arguing that the way to judge the success of a 
hypertext is by the extent to which the reader has control). 
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activity is not quick or convenient. 
Thus, Landow argues that fully-fledged hypertext systems afford 
readers the opportunity to write against the initial text; thus, 
participating in the production of meaning by creating notes or 
linked lexia that may support or contradict the initial author’s 
meaning.56  Even in less robust systems, the reader is confronted with 
choices regarding which links to follow or skip.  Consequently, the 
reader may control which lexia to foreground and which to discount.  
While digital media may be configured so as to constrain use of a 
digitized text, it may also be applied to permit unforeseen use of texts 
or novel navigation of texts. 
Still, even if the initial assessments of user control were somewhat 
exaggerated, and the comparisons to postmodern theory somewhat 
overblown, there is something more to the writerly character of this 
new media than there was to the old.  Automation of ergodic features 
makes a decided difference, rendering comparisons to previous 
media incomplete.  Hypertexts are clearly not paper texts and 
footnotes are clearly not hyperlinks.  As Fermat demonstrated, only a 
limited amount of reader annotations will fit in the physical margins 
of a paper text.57  These annotations remain marginalized texts, 
relegated to the periphery of another text and given only marginal 
status.58  Footnotes in paper texts do not call up and present the 
works referenced; physical retrieval is required.  It is at least laborious, 
if not virtually impossible, to perform a full text search of a large 
printed text.  The speed and extent of hypertext-user engagement 
differs markedly from that of previous media in magnitude, if not in 
kind.  And, even if a given reader’s pathway through the work does 
not permanently rearrange or alter the initial text, each new reading 
in some sense re-writes the text by reconsidering it, creating new 
orderings that subtly inflect the textual meaning. 
Similarly, although the initial exuberance over the feminist 
possibilities of hypertext may have been a bit excessive, there is still 
reason to believe that we may recognize an enclave for feminist 
                                                          
 56. See LANDOW, supra note 15, at 70 (asserting that the hypertext’s 
decentralization makes it a democratic medium where no single conversation, 
discipline, or ideology overshadows another, and hypertext’s essential purpose is to 
perpetuate conversation). 
 57. See SIMON SINGH, FERMAT’S ENIGMA: THE EPIC QUEST TO SOLVE THE WORLD’S 
GREATEST MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM 61-62 (1997) (describing the 300 year quest to 
confirm Pierre de Fermat’s marginalia).  “It is impossible . . . for any number that is a 
power greater than the second to be the sum of two like powers.  I have discovered a 
truly marvelous demonstration of this proposition that this margin is too narrow to 
contain.”  Id. 
 58. See Morgan, supra note 34, at 209 (observing that intertextual references in 
social science scholarship are placed in fixed positions at margins and edges, which 
ultimately diminishes their influence). 
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thinking.59  Unthinking re-inscription or re-enforcement or present 
power relation of course remains a real concern, and this concern 
may well define the point at which feminist and postmodernist 
conceptualization of the medium part company.  Feminist approaches 
are less likely to view writerly behavior as a struggle for interpretive 
control, as this is of course precisely the type of oppositional 
assumption that a feminist conception of hypertext would hope to 
avoid.  From the feminist perspective, textual approaches should not 
privilege any power relationship; instead, they should seek to subvert 
any such dominance.60  However, if the conceptual traps of power 
and control can be skirted, even the most skeptical commentators 
find ample room to regard hypertext as conducive to feminist forms 
of expression and feminist content.61 
IV.  COPYRIGHT AND HYPERTEXT 
Feminist commentators’ observations suggest that the “writerly” 
characteristics of hypertext constitute a medium that may be 
conducive to learning, writing, and thinking outside the established 
linear and hierarchical structures of traditional media.  However, 
feminist thinking also predicts that the dominant culture will resist 
such subversion of authority.  Unsurprisingly, there is already 
evidence that this is the case.  In particular, the current legal milieu 
may not be conducive to the development of such feminist or other 
non-traditional readings of digital texts.  Rather, the exclusive rights 
conferred by copyright, specifically the right of adaptation, lend 
themselves to authorial control over not only the text, but also to a 
reader’s use of the text.  The “writerly” approaches to text described 
above are not contemplated within the law of copyright, which 
governs the ownership and control of such works.  Any explicit or 
tangible re-coding of the material will likely constitute an infringing 
derivative work of the text, subject to legal sanction. 
Copyright in the United States is typically justified under a 
utilitarian rationale, which assumes that more aesthetic works will be 
created if creators are offered an opportunity to benefit monetarily 
                                                          
 59. See Greco, supra note 52, at 88 (arguing that hypertext’s emphasis on 
decentralization and non-linearity comports with women’s balanced, complicated, 
and detailed intuitive attention and reasoned care, which they inherit from their 
mothers). 
 60. See Pruitt, supra note 21, at 195 (noting that radical feminists stress gender 
hierarchies and male dominance as the basis for women’s problems in society). 
 61. See Kendrick, supra note 51, at 8 (conceding that feminist content can have a 
place in hypertext if hypertext can provide space for poetics, such that feminist 
comments and musings can coexist with the contradictions of masculinity). 
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from their created works.62  The copyright statute therefore specifies 
a series of exclusive rights that allow the copyright holder to legally 
control certain uses of a work in order to exclude the public from 
using the work without paying for those uses.63  Statutorily created 
exclusive rights constrain the availability of copyrighted works in the 
hope that more works will be produced in the first instance.  This 
general rationale purports to follow from the Constitutional mandate, 
allowing Congress the power to award copyright to “promote the 
progress of science”; that is, to benefit authors in the short term in 
order to benefit the public in the long term.64 
The rights specified under the statute include the exclusive right of 
reproduction, the “copy” right, as well as exclusive rights to distribute, 
publicly perform, publicly display, and adapt protected works.65  
Moreover, the courts’ coercive powers are available to copyright 
holders to prevent the specified uses from occurring without the 
copyright holder’s permission.  The subject matter covered by the 
statute includes original literary works (including software), 
audiovisual works (including motion pictures), dramatic works, 
pictorial or graphic works, musical compositions, and sound 
recordings.66  Each of these subject matters may be digitized to 
electronic form.  To be eligible for protection under the statute, the 
work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression long enough 
to be perceived by others, either unaided or with the aid of a 
machine.67  This requirement essentially is met any time a digitized 
work is stored in computer memory, on magnetic or optical media, or 
in other electronic storage devices.68 
As a consequence, most digital texts, including hypertext, will meet 
the criteria for protection under the copyright statute.  Specifically, 
because copyright arises spontaneously upon the work’s fixation, most 
digital texts will be subject to copyright.  Although most digital texts 
will fall under the copyright regime, the relevant statute was neither 
drafted with such materials in mind, nor with any allowance for 
                                                          
 62. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard E. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325 (1989) (explaining that finding the correct 
balance between public access and private incentive is copyright laws’ central 
challenge). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 65. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005). 
 66. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 68. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that loading copyrighted software into the RAM creates a copy under 
copyright laws because RAM can be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated”). 
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reader manipulation or re-inscription of texts.69  Whenever such 
manipulations occur in digital media, one or more of the exclusive 
rights of the original author will likely have been implicated, if not 
infringed.  Almost certainly the exclusive right to prepare and 
authorize preparation of derivative works will be infringed by the 
alteration of the work, and other rights may be implicated as well.  If 
unauthorized copies are made in the process of re-working the initial 
work, these rights may encompass the right of reproduction. 
The long-standing assumptions in copyright law dictate that 
authorial rights are triggered by user manipulation even when the 
work is instantiated in a medium that invites such manipulation.  
Copyright tends to assume that protected works are the product of a 
single guiding genius and that the product of that mind remains static 
once fixed.  Copyright law does not contemplate the interplay of 
serial writerly revisions predicted by postmodern literary theorists and 
facilitated by the malleability of hypermedia. 
Admittedly, the statute is not entirely devoid of provisions 
addressing multiple or collaborative authorship, but the possibilities 
are discrete and sharply circumscribed.  Under current United States 
copyright law, collaborative work falls into one of six categories.  First, 
if one or more of the collaborators fail to contribute the requisite 
quantum of “original expression” required for authorship under the 
Act, that contribution is not legally recognized.70  The contribution 
and its creator become invisible for legal purposes, and the result is 
considered the work of the author or authors who made recognized 
“original” contributions. 
Second, if the collaborators are employees of the same institution, 
working within the scope of their employment, then their product 
may be deemed work made for hire.71  In such a case the contributors 
similarly disappear for legal purposes, essentially becoming extensions 
of the institution.  Consequently, the employer, rather than the 
natural persons collaborating, is considered the author of the 
resulting work, effectively turning a collaborative work into the work 
of a single, fictional creator. 
                                                          
 69. See Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative 
Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257, 257-276 (1996) 
(positing that the copyright statute’s “joint work” definition does not recognize the 
fluidity and flexibility of digitalized works, and proposing that the concepts of 
“recoding” and “intertext” can be expanded to account for collaborative works in 
computer networks environment). 
 70. See Aalamuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233-35 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding 
that a consultant on Islam seeking a portion of the profits as a coauthor of the film 
Malcolm X could not recover because his contributions as a consultant did not 
demonstrate that he was a coauthor). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005). 
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Third, the collaborators may be joint authors where individual 
collaborators each contributed original expression with the intent 
that the final product constitutes a unified and integrated product.72  
As joint authors, each collaborator enjoys ownership of the entire 
product, such that any one of them can exercise any of the privileges 
of an author over the entire work, subject to an accounting to the 
other authors.73  Here each contributor is recognized as an author, 
but dual legal fictions treat each author as the author of the work in 
its entirety, and the work as if it were the work of a single guiding 
genius. 
Fourth, if the collaborators add authorized original expression 
sequentially to an existing work of original expression, the product 
may be a derivative work of the initial work.74  A derivative work is 
created whenever an existing work is re-cast, transformed, or adapted.  
In this case, each contributor is considered the author of his own 
original expression, holding copyright in the portions that he 
contributed to the final product.  Here, each contributor is treated as 
a separate author under the assumption that the individual 
contributions are distinct and conceptually separable from the whole. 
Fifth, in certain cases the product of collaboration, such as an 
anthology, may comprise a collective work, where each contributor 
holds a copyright in his particular contribution and an editor or 
compiler holds the copyright in the selection and arrangement of the 
collection as a whole.75  Here, again, the assumption is that the 
contributions can be measured off in discrete packages, such that 
ownership is easily delineated for the constituent embedded works as 
separate from ownership of the whole. 
Finally, if the collaborators add original expression to an existing 
work without authorization, the result is considered an infringement 
of the initial work.76  The resulting work has no claim to copyright 
protection as a penalty for altering the initial work without the 
author’s permission.  Therefore, because the infringing work contains 
original expression protected under the initial author’s copyright, 
that initial author is able to dominate or control any use of the 
infringing work.77  Consequently, as in the case of the insubstantial 
alteration, the statute refuses to acknowledge the subsequent 
contribution, treating the resulting work as the property of the initial 
                                                          
 72. Id. 
 73. Aalamuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1233-35. 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
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author. 
This regime of categories leaves unauthorized user manipulations 
of digital texts at best unrecognized and at worst illegal.  In either 
case, whether unappreciated or impermissible, alterations of digital 
works will be subject to the control of the initial author and the initial 
author may deploy copyright infringement to deter precisely the kind 
of collaborative and writerly activity lauded by hypertext 
commentators.  This scenario arose in some of the earliest digital 
media cases to reach the courts, specifically in cases dealing with 
computer video games.78  Computer video games may be viewed as 
essentially a rudimentary form of hypermedia, in which the player 
chooses to access stored images, sounds, and image sequences by 
means of the game console controls—the buttons, trackball, and 
joystick.  Therefore, video or computer games also raise the questions 
of authority and authorship outlined above because video games are 
considered hypermedia. 
For example, in Stern Electronics v. Kaufman, the court considered 
the problem of player participation in the context of an infringement 
suit against the supplier of an allegedly infringing video game.79  The 
defendant in the suit challenged the copyright in the plaintiff’s game, 
arguing that player control of the video output voided its original 
expression, a prerequisite condition for an authorship claim in 
copyright.80  However, the court reasoned that the player control 
generated only a variation on the plaintiff’s game.  Therefore, the 
court did not address the question of how much player participation 
is necessary before the producer of the game is no longer considered 
to have contributed enough original expression to be deemed the 
author.81 
Subsequent courts facing the same issue adopted a similar stance, 
emphasizing the limited number of choices that could be made by the 
game player.82  At least one court considered whether a given video 
                                                          
 78. See Samuelson, Some New Kinds, supra note 16, at 703 (discussing that courts 
have rejected competitors’ challenges to videogame copyrights where competitors 
argued that the players’ role in determining videogames’ action designated the 
players instead of the programmers as the videogames’ authors). 
 79. 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 80. Id. at 853. 
 81. Id. at 857. 
 82. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(asserting that the creative efforts in playing video games are not similar to arranging 
dictionary words into sentences or palette paints into a painting, rendering video 
games copyrightable as audiovisual works under the Copyright Act of 1976); see also 
Williams Electronics v. Artic Int’l, 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that 
audiovisual games are fixed and therefore warrant copyright protection because the 
audiovisual works are permanently embodied in memory devices and they are stable 
enough to be reproduced where the audiovisual features are repetitive). 
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output might be a work derivative of the game software, concluding in 
dicta that the game manufacturer was entitled to monopolize the 
work in any event.83  In deciding these challenges to video game 
copyrights, these courts focused on the copyrightable contribution of 
the game manufacturers to the images and instructions embedded in 
the game software or semiconductor chips.  The authorship of a given 
game sequence was not directly at issue.  Consequently, the courts 
never squarely addressed player contribution to any given game, 
specifically the possibility that a player is contributing original 
expression to the output, or that the output might be a work of joint 
authorship or derivative work. 
In the video game context, some implied license or authorization 
might be inferred from the nature of the game.  Specifically, the 
player surely has some type of permission to generate a new game 
pattern, which is necessary and presumably intended by the 
manufacturer so that the player can play the game.  This 
authorization may move the manipulation into the category of 
derivative work, where the reader’s contribution qualifies for its own 
authorial copyright.  Such authorization may similarly be inferred in 
other instances of digital manipulation.  For example, authorization is 
inferred where the work is made publicly available in a format, which 
is commonly altered, such as works openly accessible on the World 
Wide Web that are available for hypertext linking. 
Yet such inferred authorization may be explicitly revoked, perhaps 
by posted terms of usage indicating the initial author’s objection to a 
particular activity.  This has already occurred in cases involving the 
unauthorized annotation of web sites, or unauthorized “deep linking” 
between web pages.  An early example of such authorial saber-rattling 
occurred in conjunction with the development of the “Third Voice” 
web annotation system.84  The Third Voice system offered World 
Wide Web users a tool for annotating posted web pages, using a free 
web browser “plug-in.”85  By highlighting any piece of text displayed 
                                                          
 83. See Midway Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d at 1013-14 (concluding that the Copyright Act 
can be construed broadly to entitle the copyrighted game’s owner a monopoly over 
the speeded-up version on parallel grounds that the speeded-up version is a 
sufficiently different). 
 84. See Aaron Rubin, Comment, Are You Experienced? The Copyright 
Implications of Web Site Modification Technology, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 817-18 
(2001) (noting that website owners have posited numerous legal theories during the 
course of their objections to the use of experience-modifying technologies, including 
copyright infringement); see also Susan Kim, Comment, Selling Spray Paint in 
Cyberspace: Applying the Fair Use Defense to Inline Note Service Providers, 34 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 809, 819-20 (2001) (explaining that the fair use defense under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 affords a viable defense where a court determines that finding infringement 
would undermine the creativity that copyright law seeks to facilitate). 
 85. See Dan Knight, Third Voice Revisited (Jun. 29. 1999), http://www. 
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on a web page, Third Voice users could create an accompanying 
annotation, much in appearance like a physical Post-It note.  The 
annotations, but not the referenced web page, was stored in the Third 
Voice server.  When Third Voice users would access a web page, the 
plug in software would search for annotations related to the page, and 
the plug in software would display the annotations in a layered 
fashion in the browser displaying the referenced text. 
The service was never a great favorite with web users and eventually 
failed like many other Internet start-ups because it lacked a viable 
financial plan.  However, in the interim, Third Voice attracted the ire 
of web site creators who claimed the service violated the integrity of 
their web documents.86  Copyright theories figured prominently in 
the arguments directed against the service’s propriety.  Although the 
Third Voice service did not copy web pages that were served up from 
their usual hosts, detractors charged that the web page displays with 
annotations constituted the creation of an unauthorized derivative 
work.87 
Similar copyright claims have been raised in cases involving 
unwanted links between documents on the World Wide Web.88  In 
some cases, these disputes have involved so-called “deep links,” which 
refer web site users to pages out of the sequence intended by the web 
site owner.89  Other disputes have involved “in line” linking, by which 
                                                          
lowendmac.com/musings/thirdvoice3.shtml (observing that webmasters have 
objected to user annotations on web pages through the use of Third Voice because 
webmasters feel that they do not have control over the use or abuse of voices on their 
web pages). 
 86. See id. (noting that some webmasters believe Third Voice changed the nature 
of web pages). 
 87. See John Gartner, Readers Speak with Third Voice, WIRED 1 (May 17, 1999), 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,19722,00.html (detailing the story 
of Third Voice founder Eng-Siong, who felt that Third Voice would change web 
publishing’s passivity by providing readers a voice via a free browser tool that merely 
“snaps onto” the bottom of a web browser window, similar to Post-It notes). 
 88. See Dan L. Burk, Proprietary Rights in Hypertext Linkages, 1998(2) J. INFO. L. 
& TECH. 1, 1, http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/intprop/98_2burk/ (documenting a 
dispute between rival British newspapers, where one of the papers successfully 
obtained an injunction against the other’s hypertext links, which offered competitors’ 
news stories with verbatim headlines via hot links); see also Edward A. Cavazos & Coe 
F. Miles, Copyright on the WWW: Linking and Liability, 4 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 13-14 
(1997) (describing prominent news entities’ suits against TotalNEWS, which used 
frame technology to offer a number of links to unaffiliated news sources while 
simultaneously displaying its own logo); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: 
Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 630-37 (1998) (noting that 
until recently, owners implicitly authorized access to auxiliary sites via linking by 
placing material on the web without restrictions, but Ticketmaster’s suit against 
Microsoft questioning the validity of linking under copyright and trademark law 
presented new approaches to copyright infringement suits). 
 89. See Roberta Jacobs-Meadway, Surveillance on the Internet: Police and 
Protect, SK102 ALI-ABA 273, 279 (2005) (defining “deep links” as those which are 
found two or three levels within a web site). 
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files from one server are called up to be displayed in frames generated 
by a different server.90  In such cases, no copy is ever made or 
distributed by the linking server.  In the case of deep linking, the 
linking server only supplies the user with the information as to where 
the linked material can be found.  In the case of in line linking, the 
linking server supplies the locational information and generates a 
“frame” within which the material will be displayed on the user’s 
computer.  In both in line linking and deep linking, the linked 
material is served directly to the user’s machine at the user’s 
computer’s request. 
Consequently, rights of reproduction or distribution cannot be at 
issue if the owner of the displayed material objects to the link—the 
site providing the link has neither reproduced nor distributed the 
linked files.  Public performance and public display cannot seriously 
be at issue either, so long as it is the owner of the material that has 
done the displaying, serving the files up at the user’s request.  Rather, 
it is the right of adaptation that may be at issue, especially in the case 
of the “in line” link—the linked material is associated by link with 
other material not of the owner’s choosing.  Although the law relating 
to derivative works is unsettled,91 there is fairly strong support in cases 
involving traditional media that unauthorized presentation or 
rearrangement of a copyrighted work infringes the right of 
adaptation.92 
The right of adaptation is similarly at issue in recent controversy 
surrounding ClearPlay, a vendor of preset DVD controls for movie 
playback.  The ClearPlay controls, incorporated either into computer 
software or into a specialized DVD player, are intended to eliminate 
objectionable language, violence, or sexual content from DVD movie 
playback.93  Unlike many forms of movie media, DVDs allow the 
                                                          
 90. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that in-line linking creates the appearance that the in-lined image is a “seamless part” 
of the secondary web site). 
 91. Compare Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (ruling that a 
company’s ceramic tiles, which displayed another artist’s works, were not derivative 
works under the copyright act), with Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 
856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a tile seller who transferred 
artworks from a commemorative book to individual tiles for sale to the public were 
derivative works that infringed the copyright). 
 92. See, e.g., Agee v. Paramount Comm’ns, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 324 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that an infringing derivative work of a sound recording requires the user 
to rearrange, remix, or otherwise alter the sequence or quality of the recording’s 
actual fixed sounds); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(finding that unauthorized editing of an underlying work, such as a television script, 
would constitute an infringement of the copyright of the work because such a use 
would exceed the license granted by the proprietor and prevent him or her from 
controlling how the work is presented to the public). 
 93. Mike Snider, Hollywood Riled Up Over Clearplay, USA TODAY, May 6, 2004, at 
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viewer to access scenes out of the original sequence; skim forward or 
backward through images; pause, repeat, or skip certain images or 
sequences of images, effectively rendering the DVD a form of 
hypermedia.  In theory a DVD viewer who was familiar with the 
content of a movie might fast forward through portions that might be 
inappropriate for children or objectionable on other grounds.  
ClearPlay provides movie-specific software that automates the process 
by skipping past material deemed objectionable during movie 
playback, but not altering the content stored on the underlying 
DVD.94 
Movie directors object to such editing, arguing that even though 
movies played in an edited format may garner a new audience that 
might not otherwise have viewed the work, the edited movie is 
mutilated or altered from the original artistic intent.95  Directors and 
studios have enlisted copyright law to fight such viewing, claiming that 
an unauthorized derivative work is created by these DVD controls.96  
Case law considering alterations to video games suggests that no 
derivative work is created when the underlying work is not 
permanently altered.97  However, other cases suggest that a computer 
program which accesses the images of an underlying video game in a 
new sequence can itself constitute an unauthorized derivative work 
because it essentially tells a “new story” based on the original game.98  
Selective accessing of movie scenes to “tell a new story” might place 
the ClearPlay software into the latter category.99 
                                                          
1D. 
 94. ClearPlay Homepage, http://www.clearplay.com/. 
 95. See Brenda Sandburg, Artistic Differences, THE RECORDER May 11, 2004, at 1 
(reporting that Steven Spielberg, Martin Scorsese, Robert Redford, and Steven 
Soderbergh teamed with seven motion picture studios to get ClearPlay off the market 
based on claims that it violated their trademarks and copyrights). 
 96. See id. (stating that the directors and studios claimed that ClearPlay’s deletion 
and editing of scenes is a distortion of the original movie and, thus, is a derivative 
work even though it is not fixed in a tangible form). 
 97. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 
968 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the Game Genie, a device used to alter up to three 
features of a Nintendo game, did not constitute an infringing derivative work because 
it does not produce output in permanent form); see also Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use 
for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The 
Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J.INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 75-76 (1993) (stating 
that Congress meant for creators to invoke the derivative work right only when a 
second work incorporated expression from the first work, such as when a screenplay 
implements the plot of a novel, but not when a consumer experiments with the 
method of a videogame). 
 98. See, e.g., Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that the “Nuke It” computer game, which contained new levels to be used in 
playing another company’s computer game, constituted an infringing derivative work 
because the audiovisual displays in the new levels assumed a permanent form in the 
computer game’s MAP files). 
 99. In the particular case of ClarPlay’s technology, Congress ultimately carved out 
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The result of such reasoning can be generalized to most hypertext 
applications by which the reader manipulates or alters the text as laid 
down by the author.  Under the standard articulated in such 
decisions, the user-initiated reordering permitted by hypertext systems 
will essentially always result in the unauthorized adaptation of the 
underlying material.  Although these adaptations might arguably be 
excused in some case by implied permission or by a user privilege 
such as fair use, the activity remains largely subject to the whim of the 
initial author.  This implies that writerly alterations of hypertext are 
unauthorized under current law because they are made without the 
copyright owner’s explicit permission by a user of the text who the law 
will not consider to be an author in the formal sense of the word, and 
who falls outside the canon of control implicit in the ideological 
development of the term “author.” 
V.  COPYRIGHT AND FEMINISM 
These instances of contested digital manipulation reviewed here 
suggest that the derivative work right confers upon authors the right 
not only to control the work, but also, as Justin Hughes has aptly 
stated, the right to control the framework in which the work is 
situated.100  The upshot of such analysis, somewhat startling in its 
implications, is that copyright allows authors to control how readers 
read a text, particularly a digital text where Barthes’ writerly 
manipulations become manifest.  It is precisely the characteristics of 
hypertext, which most appeal to feminists and hypertext theorists, that 
violate the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  Uses of a text that 
result in derivative works are not countenanced by the statute.  
Feminists may see within hypertext the potential for new relationships 
between writer and reader or for the flowering of interconnected, 
relational learning and thinking.  But current copyright doctrine 
assumes that works remain linear rather than ergodic, static rather 
than dynamic, and fixed rather than fluid.  The statute remains 
locked into a particular model of the relationship between author, 
reader, and text, and backs that relationship with the coercive power 
of the state. 
                                                          
an exception to the rights of the copyright owner, authorizing the use of the 
technology as parental controls to encourage family values via the Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005.  See Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 202 (2005) 
(codifying the FMA by amending § 110 of Title 17 to exempt “the making 
imperceptible, by or at the direction of a private household, of limited portions of 
audio or video content of a motion picture . . . ”). 
 100. See Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and 
Context, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 30 (2001) (defining framework as the 
context in which the artist’s work is presented). 
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It is no surprise that copyright displays an inherent hostility to such 
conjoint works.  Over the past decade, copyright scholars have 
amassed a sizeable body of critical and historical commentary 
identifying the concept of the “romantic author” as a key assumption 
underlying current legal doctrine.101  Copyright law embraces a 
romanticized version of authorship, arising out of Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth century notions of authorship, assuming that protectable 
works are the result of the creative efforts of a single heroic genius.  
This view tends to assume that collaborative work is an anomaly, and 
ignores or subordinates the predicate contributions of non-authors 
from whom an author may draw.  It certainly offers no allowance for 
the “writerly” contribution that a reader or user of the work might 
make to the work’s meaning. 
This scholarly literature on copyright’s latent assumptions 
regarding authors goes hand in hand with recent examination of the 
assumptions latent in the copyright statute regarding readers.102  
Examining the various doctrines and statutory provisions regarding 
users or recipients of copyrighted works, Joseph Liu concludes that 
the copyright statute assumes that such users fall into one of two 
categories: (1) they are passive recipients of the work who simply 
absorb the work as delivered by the author, much like Barthes’ passive 
consumer of readerly texts; or (2) they are recognized as follow-on 
authors themselves, who may be transforming old works into original 
new expression.103  Little or no provision is made for recipients who 
may reinterpret or re-vision the work without creating original new 
works.  This statutory assumption again reflects the sharp division 
between author and reader, designating the reader as “other.” 
Recent scholarship has begun to identify and investigate the 
gendered origin and character of these statutory assumptions.  
Historical analyses of institutionalized publication show that the 
milieu from which notions of authorship and copyright are drawn 
were rife with notions of paternity over texts that the masculine 
                                                          
 101. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
"Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J., 455, 467 (explaining that this idea of authorship 
privileges the notion of creativity, originality, and inspiration over mastery of the rules 
of literature to establish ownership of the work); Martha Woodmansee, On the 
Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 291-92 
(1992) (arguing that today a creative work may claim legal protection only if it is a 
unique, original product from the intellect of the individual artist). 
 102. See Joseph Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 
398-99 (2003) (concluding that despite the Copyright Act’s goal of benefiting the 
public, the Act rarely identifies the consumer and fails to define the shape and scope 
of consumer interest within copyright law). 
 103. See id. at 401 (noting that these conceptions of the consumer are incomplete 
and that the consumer has additional interests in autonomy and self expression). 
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author had “begotten.”104  This biological formulation of creativity is 
reflected in the nature and character of the rights that became 
associated with authorship.  Shelly Wright notes that copyright law 
hinges largely upon exclusive rights of “reproduction,” a concept with 
strong semantic and rhetorical association to procreation and family 
ordering.105  Indeed, in jurisdictions that recognize moral rights, what 
is now called the right of attribution was classically denominated as 
the “right of paternity” that grants the author the right to demand 
identification as the progenitor and originator of a work. 
This metaphor of masculine parentage is closely tied to the notion 
of the heroic author.  Romantic notions of authorship, like 
patriarchal notions of fatherhood, entail a lineal and simple causality 
between the effort or activity of authors and the works they 
develop.106  The romantic image encompasses the sense of masculine 
isolation identified by relational feminists.107  The text itself becomes 
the feminized “other” against which the author is differentiated.108  
Moreover, the myth of singular paternity ignores the contributions of 
other, often invisible contributors to the work and raises the image of 
the author to iconic status.109  The author is thus envisioned as a 
discrete and solitary individual, separate from both the community 
that consumes the work and from the relational network of shared 
understandings and cultural images within which the work arises.110 
Gendered formulations of ownership stem from the paternity 
metaphor as well.  Feminist commentators have noted that the 
“substantial similarity” test for copyright infringement echoes 
historical doctrines of family law in which patriarchal control over the 
purity of biological reproduction was premised upon familial 
likeness.111  This parallel is graphically, if unwittingly, illustrated by 
recent directors’ comments that label ClearPlay and similar viewing 
                                                          
 104. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 32 (1993). 
 105. See Wright, supra note 8, at 63 (finding that this concept is related to 
patriarchal notions of the roles of women and children). 
 106. See id. at 78 (emphasizing that copies or “reproductions” of a work that are 
similar to the original work will be assumed to be copies without having to prove 
authorship). 
 107. See id. at 74 (stating that the traditional, patriarchal perception of women is 
that they are naturally tied to other humans and thus cannot be individuals). 
 108. WENDY WALL, THE IMPRINT OF GENDER: AUTHORSHIP AND PUBLICATION IN THE 
ENGLISH RENAISSANCE 282 (1993). 
 109. See Wright, supra note 8, at 84 (noting that in contrast to men, female writers 
were historically denigrated, causing them to often use their husbands’ names for 
publishing). 
 110. See id. at 62 (arguing that the inspiration for the Copyright Act the “solitary 
male genius”). 
 111. See id. at 78 (noting that this is similar to marital laws that protect inheritance 
and ensure the legitimacy of children). 
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technologies as a “bastardization” of their films.112  In this 
formulation, copyright closely parallels the character of paternalistic 
marriage, custody, and paternity laws that have been identified as 
intended to control female reproduction in order to ensure 
legitimacy of offspring and concomitantly control inheritance of land 
and chattels.113  Debora Halbert thus notes that such discourses led 
inevitably from masculine notions of textual authorship to paternal 
conceptualizations of property and ownership; as much as a man’s 
child or wife was regarded as his chattel, so were his texts.114 
This quality of masculine separation carries through to the present 
copyright statute, shaping doctrines such as the right of adaptation in 
ways inimical to collaborative or hypertextual re-formation of texts.  
Feminist critique of property notes that the separation between owner 
and owned sets the object of ownership apart, and that in turn 
engenders power over the thing so designated.115  Power over a thing 
is effectively synonymous with property, especially private property.116  
The right to exclude others constitutes the canonical trope for 
defining property, meaning that canonical property by definition 
requires a boundary of separation from non-property.  In the case of 
literary property, this necessitates clear separations between author 
and text, reader and text, and author and reader.  To the extent that 
hypertext dissolves or blurs such boundaries, its qualities are 
altogether alien to the copyright regime. 
This characteristic of the statute should in some sense be expected.  
Copyright comprises a form of control or power over users in part 
because the statute’s stated purpose under U.S. law is to allow authors 
to extract payments in exchange for permission to use the protected 
work.117  This justification might be challenged under feminist 
theory, which might offer a differing view of the Constitutional 
                                                          
 112. See Snider, supra note 94 (quoting film director Irwin Winkler). 
 113. See Wright, supra note 8, at 78 (observing that the copyright laws are similar 
to the historic family arrangement, in which all property belongs to and flows towards 
the husband and father). 
 114. See Halbert, supra note 8, at 113 (noting that in the area of intellectual 
copyright law, the author is considered the father and the work the child). 
 115. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Laws, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, in LAW AND 
THE ORDER OF CULTURE 162, 177 (Robert Post ed., 1990) (arguing that the rules of 
property give a false sense of autonomy, privacy, and security and determines how 
much power or powerlessness a person will hold). 
 116. Carlton Clark, Hypertext Theory and the Rhetoric of Empowerment: A 
Feminist Alternative, 7.3 KAIROS 11 (2002), http://english.ttu.edu/kairos/7.3/binder 
2.html?coverweb/clark/page1.html. 
 117. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (explaining that the 
economic philosophy behind Congress granting copyright is the idea that the 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to benefit the 
public). 
29
Burk: Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
548 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:3 
mandate—an ambitious undertaking rather beyond the scope of this 
short paper.  However, even within the current justification of the 
copyright regime, the present formulation of the copyright doctrine 
contemplates a specific canon of control that privileges some types of 
“progress” over others.  The current assumptions embedded in the 
statute may in fact foreclose progress in the development of 
innovative, non-traditional works. 
There is reason to believe that the term “Progress” as used by the 
framers in the Constitution may have meant something quite 
different than common usage of the term today, either colloquially or 
legally.118  Under either definition, however, Margaret Chon points 
out that there is no reason to privilege a particular type of 
informational development at the expense of others.119  Yet the 
danger of suppressing alternative forms of knowledge, learning, and 
scholarship on the basis of the copyright law’s unstated assumptions 
or hierarchy and linearity is real.  The exclusive right of adaptation, 
suppressing unauthorized uses of the text, implements a bias against 
collaborative or non-linear uses of text that forecloses certain modes 
of thought and discovery that might be termed “feminist.”  This 
perspective stands in stark contrast to some recent commentary 
suggesting that the development of digital media requires granting 
authors new rights over the manner in which audiences experience 
copyrighted works.120  From a feminist perspective, such a move to 
expand authorial domination over the reader’s experience seems 
especially pernicious.  Doing so promises to simply reinforce current 
patterns of thought and dominance and may serve to impede 
copyright’s stated goal of promoting the progress of science. 
                                                          
 118. See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining 
"Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or 
Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755 (2001) (discussing the 
meanings of “progress” in the Progress Clause and proposing that it means spread, 
diffuse, and distribute). 
 119. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright 
and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 145 (1993) (advocating that it is 
inappropriate to accord the modernist view of progress a privileged status because the 
objective of copyright and patent law should not be sheer material growth, but rather 
understood as access to knowledge). 
 120. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 
1613 (2001) (concluding that the emergence of new technology may justify granting 
copyright owners a higher degree of control over works); Jane C. Ginsburg, From 
Having Copies to Experiencing Works, in US INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & POLICY 
(Hugh Hansen ed., 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id 
=222493 (proffering that Congress should grant copyright holders an access right in 
the current digital online environment, allowing the author to control the manner in 
which the public apprehends the work). 
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CONCLUSION 
My goal in this essay has been primarily critical, pointing out the 
disparity between what feminists have seen in hypermedia and what 
current conceptions of copyright will allow, and suggesting that the 
legal constraint inherent in the right of adaptation may impoverish 
the progress that copyright is nominally intended to promote.  What 
may be required in order to accommodate such progress is not only 
revision, but also a re-visioning of the statute.  The tenets of feminist 
theory may beneficially guide such reform.  Although only a scant 
handful of commentators to date have applied any aspect of feminist 
theory to the analysis of copyright, those that have begun to do so 
suggest that feminism might constitute a different formulation of 
copyright and of the incentives used to foster “progress.”121  While 
such exposition of a feminist approach to copyright remains tentative, 
they suggest a construct within which creativity is not so much 
something to be controlled and possessed, but instead something to 
be reciprocated and shared where progress is driven by collaboration 
and connection, instead of by exclusion and separation.  For example, 
a feminist approach might regard and reward an artist’s connections 
to other artists and their creative works, rather than focusing on 
authorial identity and attachment to a particular work.122  Such a re-
visioning of the statute would be ambitious, and perhaps impractical, 
but may be necessary before digital media can fulfill the promise that 
feminist and hypertext theorists foresee. 
 
                                                          
 121. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 8, at 119 (arguing that a feminist future would 
eliminate intellectual property law which impedes creativity by focusing on ownership 
and instead would emphasize the relational and communitarian aspects of creation 
and learning); Andrea Lunsford, Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of Ownership, 
61 COLL. ENGLISH 529, 534 (1999) (advocating for a shift in the values underlying 
ownership, which might redistribute intellectual property in new ways). 
 122. See Wright, supra note 8, at 80 (arguing in favor of emphasizing the 
communal nature of authorship, rather than obsessing about authorial identity). 
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